How do you design and secure Node.js APIs end to end?

Build hardened Node.js APIs with validation, authZ/authN, and defenses against XSS/CSRF/prototype pollution.
Apply a battle-tested Node.js API security blueprint: schema validation, JWT/OAuth2, least privilege, and exploit mitigations.

answer

I design Node.js APIs with schema-first input validation, strict authentication (JWT/OAuth2 with short-lived tokens and refresh rotation), and authorization via roles/attributes at the route/service layer. I prevent injection and client risks with output encoding, CSP, and CORS. CSRF is blocked via same-site, double-submit tokens, or proof-of-possession. I freeze prototypes, pin dependencies, sandbox unsafe parsing, and instrument rate limits, audit logs, and anomaly alerts.

Long Answer

A secure Node.js API starts with clear trust boundaries, then enforces correctness at every hop: inputs, identity, permissions, and outputs. I use a layered approach that treats validation and authorization as code, not convention.

1) Interface & validation (fail closed)

I adopt schema-first contracts (OpenAPI/JSON Schema). Every handler validates params, query, and body with Zod/Yup/Ajv before touching business code. Policies:

  • Deny by default: unknown properties stripped; lengths, enums, formats enforced (email, UUID, ISO dates).
  • Canonicalization: trim/normalize strings, lower-case emails, parse numbers safely; reject ambiguous encodings.
  • File inputs: verify MIME/extension, scan size/virus, store outside webroot, generate random names.
  • Mass assignment: whitelist assignment fields; never spread raw body into models.

2) Authentication (who are you?)

For first-party apps I prefer OAuth2/OIDC with Authorization Code + PKCE; for pure APIs I issue JWT access tokens scoped to resources. Practices:

  • Short-lived access tokens (5–15m) + refresh rotation with reuse detection.
  • Asymmetric signing (RS/ES) with kid rotation via JWKS; verify iss/aud/exp/nbf.
  • Transport: TLS 1.2+, HSTS, secure cookie for session tokens; avoid localStorage for long-lived secrets.
  • M2M: use Client Credentials with fine-grained scopes; never re-use human tokens.

3) Authorization (what can you do?)

I centralize authorization behind a policy layer:

  • RBAC + ABAC: start with roles, extend with attributes (tenant, region, ownership).
  • Resource scoping: verify tenant IDs on every query; never trust client-provided userId/tenantId—derive from token claims.
  • Least privilege: require explicit scopes/permissions per route; deny read-modify-write without ownership checks.
  • Query guards: inject filters server-side (e.g., WHERE tenant_id = :fromToken) to prevent horizontal escalation.

4) Threat coverage & hardening

XSS (for mixed API/HTML responses): escape output, set CSP (default-src 'self'), encode JSON safely ()]}', prefix when embedding). For pure JSON APIs, keep responses JSON-only with correct Content-Type.
CSRF: Prefer stateless Bearer in Authorization header (not cookies). If cookie-based, enforce SameSite=Lax/Strict, HttpOnly, CSRF tokens (double-submit) or DPoP/PoP for proof-of-possession.
Injection: use parameterized queries/ORM; never build SQL/NoSQL strings from input. Disable $where in Mongo; validate operators; sanitize regex.
Prototype pollution: deny __proto__, constructor, prototype keys; deep clone with safe libraries; use Object.create(null) for maps; freeze configs with Object.freeze.
Path traversal: resolve paths with path.resolve, ensure within allowed base dir, never echo raw file paths.
Command injection: prefer library APIs; if exec is unavoidable, escape args, use allow-lists, drop privileges.
Deserialization: avoid eval-like parsing; for YAML/JSON5 use safe modes; cap payload sizes to stop DoS.

5) Transport, CORS, and headers

  • CORS: restrict origin, methods, and headers; avoid * with credentials; preflight cache controlled.
  • Security headers: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security.
  • Rate limit / Bot defense: token bucket per IP + user/tenant; exponential backoff; captcha only at abuse thresholds.
  • DoS protection: body size limits, timeouts, circuit breakers for upstreams, queue/backpressure.

6) Secrets, keys, and configs

Manage secrets via environment injection (Vault/KMS/Secrets Manager). Rotate JWT signing keys with overlapping validity; publish JWKS. Use NODE_OPTIONS=--disable-proto=throw (supported runtimes) to harden prototypes. Enforce npm provenance: lockfiles, npm audit, npm pkg provenance, and allow-list registries.

7) Observability & audit

Structured logs (request ID, user/tenant, scope, outcome), privacy-safe (no tokens/PII). Emit security events (login, consent, role changes, failed auth, refresh reuse). Traces around external calls; metrics on p95 latency, error rates, 401/403 ratios, rate-limit triggers. Alert on anomalies (sudden spike of 401→200, mass 5xx).

8) Testing & CI/CD

  • Unit: validators, policy functions, claim checks.
  • Integration: happy-path and abuse-path suites (oversized payloads, traversal, proto pollution keys).
  • Contract: OpenAPI validation in CI; Dredd/Prism mocks for consumers.
  • Security: SAST/DAST, dependency scan, secret scan, license check.
  • Deploy: immutable images, minimal base, non-root user, read-only FS, drop CAP_*.

9) Example flow (update own profile)

  1. Client requests token via OAuth2; receives access (10m) + rotating refresh.
  2. Calls PATCH /me with Bearer token; gateway verifies signature, iss/aud/exp; policy resolves subject.
  3. Input validated (allowed fields only).
  4. Authorization checks ownership (sub matches record).
  5. DB update via parameterized query.
  6. Response JSON with ETag; logs record the action, no PII; metrics count a success.

This blueprint keeps Node.js APIs correct by construction, minimizing exploit surfaces and ensuring identity and authorization are continuously verified.

Table

Area Practice Implementation Outcome
Validation Schema-first, deny unknown OpenAPI + Zod/Ajv, trim/normalize Early reject, fewer bugs
AuthN Short-lived JWT + rotation OIDC/OAuth2, RS/ES keys, JWKS Strong identity, safe rollover
AuthZ RBAC + ABAC, tenant scoping Claims-derived filters, policy funcs Least privilege, no lateral moves
CSRF/XSS SameSite/CSRF tokens, CSP Cookies HttpOnly, PoP/DPoP, escaping Stops token theft & script abuse
Injection Parameterized ops ORM/driver params, regex caps No SQL/NoSQL injection
Prototype Pollution Key denylist & safe clone --disable-proto=throw, freeze configs Blocks object poisoning
Headers/CORS Tight allow-lists CORS per-origin, HSTS, nosniff Safe cross-origin, hard transport
Rate/DoS Limits & backpressure Token bucket, body size, timeouts Resilient under load
Secrets Managed & rotated Vault/KMS, lockfiles, SCA Fewer secret and supply-chain risks
Observability Audits & metrics Traces, 401/403 ratios, alerts Rapid detection & response

Common Mistakes

  • Validating only request bodies, ignoring query/params/headers.
  • Long-lived JWTs without refresh rotation or revocation; using HS256 with shared secrets across services.
  • Trusting client-sent IDs for authorization instead of deriving from claims.
  • Using cookies with SameSite=None but missing Secure; storing tokens in localStorage.
  • Open CORS (*) with credentials enabled.
  • Building SQL/NoSQL strings by concatenation; allowing $where/unbounded regex in Mongo.
  • Accepting prototype keys (__proto__, constructor) during deep merges.
  • No body size limits or timeouts; app crashes under large uploads or slowloris.
  • Logging tokens/PII; missing audit trails for role changes/login failures.
  • Unpinned dependencies, disabled npm audit, and running Node as root in production.

Sample Answers

Junior:
“I validate inputs with Zod and use parameterized queries. Auth uses JWT access tokens and I check iss/aud/exp. CORS is restricted to known origins. I send cookies with HttpOnly and SameSite, and add basic rate limiting.”

Mid:
“I design schema-first APIs (OpenAPI + Ajv), short-lived JWTs with RS256 and refresh rotation, and authorization via RBAC plus tenant filters derived from claims. I prevent CSRF with SameSite cookies and CSRF tokens when needed, and enforce CSP for any HTML. I block prototype keys and set strict CORS and headers.”

Senior:
“I implement OIDC with PKCE, asymmetric JWTs, JWKS rotation, and policy-based authorization (RBAC+ABAC). Validation denies unknown fields; mass assignment is prevented. I harden against XSS/CSRF/injection, disable prototype mutation, and add rate limits/backpressure. CI enforces SAST/DAST, dependency and secret scans; runtime emits audit events and alerts on anomalies. Deploys run non-root, read-only, with least privileges.”

Evaluation Criteria

  • Validation rigor: Schema-first, covers body/query/params, denies unknown, normalizes inputs.
  • Authentication depth: Short-lived asymmetric JWTs, refresh rotation, OIDC/PKCE, JWKS rotation.
  • Authorization quality: RBAC/ABAC, tenant scoping, server-side filters, least privilege.
  • Threat coverage: XSS/CSRF/injection/prototype pollution mitigations and safe headers/CORS.
  • Operational security: Rate limiting, body limits, timeouts, safe logging, alerts.
  • Supply chain/Runtime: Pinned deps, scans, non-root, read-only, minimal image, secrets management.
  • Testing/CI: Unit/integration/abuse cases, OpenAPI contract checks, SAST/DAST gates.
    Red flags: Long-lived HS256 tokens, open CORS with creds, trusting client IDs, localStorage tokens, no rotation or audit.

Preparation Tips

  • Generate an OpenAPI spec and wire Ajv/Zod for request/response validation.
  • Implement OIDC login → access (10m) + rotating refresh; verify tokens with JWKS.
  • Build a policy module (RBAC+ABAC) that maps claims → permissions → SQL filters.
  • Add CSP, strict CORS, HttpOnly cookies, and CSRF tokens where cookies are used.
  • Write injection tests (SQL/NoSQL/regex), and block __proto__/constructor keys in deep merges.
  • Configure rate limits, body limits, timeouts; simulate slowloris/large payloads.
  • Set up CI with SAST/DAST, dependency and secret scanning; pin lockfiles.
  • Run Node in a non-root container, read-only FS, minimal base; rotate keys.
  • Create dashboards for 401/403 ratios, refresh reuse, and rate-limit hits; alert on spikes.

Real-world Context

Marketplace API: Lacked tenant scoping—users could query others’ orders. Fix: ABAC guard injecting tenant_id from claims into all queries plus policy tests; support tickets dropped sharply.
Fintech backend: Long-lived HS256 JWTs shared across services; key leak caused exposure. Migrated to RS256 with JWKS rotation, 10m TTL, refresh rotation with reuse detection.
SaaS uploads: Prototype pollution via __proto__ in JSON merge led to handler crash. Denylisted keys, used safe deep-merge, and enabled --disable-proto=throw.
Retail app: Open CORS with credentials caused token theft via malicious origin. Locked origins, added SameSite cookies and CSRF tokens; added CSP for admin HTML.
Ops win: Rate limits + body caps + timeouts absorbed scraper spikes without outages.

Key Takeaways

  • Schema-first validation and deny-by-default prevent bad states early.
  • Prefer OIDC + short-lived asymmetric JWTs with rotation; derive authZ from claims.
  • Harden against XSS/CSRF/injection/prototype pollution; set strict headers/CORS.
  • Add limits, backpressure, and observability to survive abuse.
  • Lock supply chain and runtime: scans, least privilege, signed/rotated keys.

Practice Exercise

Scenario:
You’re shipping a multi-tenant Node.js API for projects and files. Requirements: schema validation, OIDC auth, RBAC+ownership checks, secure uploads, CSRF-safe web console, and resilience under scraping.

Tasks:

  1. Contracts & validation: Author OpenAPI for POST /projects, GET /files/:id, PATCH /me. Implement Ajv/Zod validators for params/query/body; deny unknown props; normalize strings.
  2. AuthN: Integrate OIDC (Auth Code + PKCE). Verify JWT with JWKS (RS256). Access TTL 10m; implement refresh rotation with reuse detection.
  3. AuthZ: Create policy middleware: role checks + ABAC (tenant_id from token). Auto-inject tenant filter into ORM queries; reject cross-tenant IDs.
  4. Uploads: Enforce MIME/size; randomize names; store outside webroot; virus-scan stub; signed download URLs.
  5. Threats: Add CSP, strict CORS per tenant domain; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax for console cookies + CSRF tokens. Deny __proto__/constructor keys during deep merges; set body size limits, timeouts.
  6. Ops: Add rate limiting (IP + user), request IDs, structured logs (no tokens). Expose metrics: p95, 401/403 ratio, rate-limit hits.
  7. CI/CD: Secret scan, SAST/DAST, dep audit, OpenAPI contract tests; non-root container, read-only FS.
  8. Tests: Abuse cases (SQL/regex/proto keys), refresh reuse replay, CSRF attempt, cross-tenant access, oversize upload.

Deliverable:
A repo demonstrating secure Node.js API patterns with validators, OIDC+RBAC/ABAC, hardened uploads, CSRF-safe console, limits/observability, and automated security checks passing green.

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